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Both proximity-concentration trade-off and factor proportions explanations have been
forwarded to explain the existence of multinational enterprises. This paper analyses to what
extent these different explanations are supported empirically, in making a first attempt to
distinguish explicitly between horizontally and vertically integrated multinationals. The
affiliate production share of horizontally integrated multinationals is mainly explained by low
plant-level economies of scale, large host country size and similarities in relative factor
endowments. Differences for vertical multinationals appear with regard to firm- and plant-
level economies of scale, country size, trade costs and relative factor endowments at the
national and sectoral level.
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Luxembourg.I. INTRODUCTION
On both a regional and a global scale, the importance of multinational enterprises and
Foreign Direct Investment have grown dramatically in recent decades. Against this
background, it is thus not surprising that ‘new’ trade theory is now deemed to be an
inappropriate reflection of reality, as multinationals are excluded from the analysis.
Starting with the early approaches of Helpman (1984) and Markusen (1984), new
literature has emerged which takes account of the increasing importance of multinational
production in servicing foreign markets. Most of the newer models concentrate on
horizontally integrated multinationals (e.g. Brainard, 1993a; Horstmann & Markusen, 1992;
Motta, 1992; Markusen & Venables, 1996a,b, 1998).
Indeed, stylised facts point towards horizontal multinationals being far more important
empirically than vertically integrated multinationals. In the context of Sweden, however, it has
been argued that the relationship between Swedish parents and their European affiliates is to a
significant extent of a vertical nature (Andersson et al. 1996).
This distinction is important both on theoretical and empirical grounds, as horizontal
multinationals tend to arise if countries are similar in relative and absolute factor endowments,
and if trade costs are medium to high, while vertical multinationals arise mainly if countries
are very different with respect to their relative factor endowments and if trade costs between
countries are low (Markusen et al., 1996).
Recent empirical tests of both proximity-concentration trade-off hypothesis (Brainard,
1997; Ekholm, 1998) and the factor proportions explanation of multinational sales (Brainard,
1993b; Ekholm, 1995, 1997) failed to explicitly distinguish the type of integration between
parent and affiliate. Brainard (1993b) distinguished between multinational sales destined for
local sales and multinational sales destined for exports to the home country, i.e. between
horizontally and vertically backward integrated multinationals. She did this in an attempt to
shed light on the poor performance of the factor proportions explanation of multinationals
sales.
The main objective of this paper is thus to make an explicit attempt to analyse whether
these different theoretical predictions in relation to horizontal vs. vertical multinationals are
supported by the data for EU countries. Secondly, separating horizontally integrated
multinationals from vertically integrated multinationals also allows us to test the proximity-
concentration trade-off hypothesis. As only very few empirical tests have been conducted to
test these general propositions, this paper will help to show whether previous empiricalfindings are robust. This is particularly important as the countries in Brainard (1997) were
chosen to “maximise diversity in geographical coverage, income, production structure, and
data coverage” (Brainard, 1997, p. 525). In choosing a relatively homogenous group of
countries, as is the case for EU member states, it will be important to see whether her
empirical results are still supported.
In the empirical analysis, we use plant and firm level data from Swedish multinationals
in the manufacturing industry, collected on a quadrennial basis at the Research Institute of
Industrial Economics in Stockholm. In doing so, we restrict ourselves to multinationals
already in existence.
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 explores the theoretical
background. This will lead to the formulation of testable hypotheses. Section 3 presents the
data and sources, while section 4 derives the econometric specification. Section 5 discusses
the empirical results, and the final section concludes.
II. THEORETICAL ASPECTS
Horizontal multinationals have received more attention in the theoretical literature than
vertical multinationals. This may be in line with stylised facts, which point towards horizontal
multinationals being more relevant empirically than vertical multinationals (Markusen, 1995).
In the case of Sweden, such a general statement may however be misleading. As table 1
shows, the relationship between Swedish parents and their EU affiliates shows considerable
signs of vertical integration.
Table 1
Vertical integration between Swedish parent and EC affiliates
a
Avg. share of parents’
exports of intermediates
to parents’ exports to
EC affiliates
Avg. share of parents’
exports of intermediates
to total parent exports
to the EC
Avg. share of parents’
exports of intermediates
to EC affiliates sales
Avg. share of affiliate
exports to Sweden to
EC affiliate sales
1974 52.4% 19.8% 9.4% 12.5%
1978 53.4% 15.5% 10.5% 15.7%
1986 44.0% 12.9% 9.6% 9.2%
1990 46.0% 11.4% 8.1% 10.3%
1994 43.4% 15.0% 9.5% 10.3%
a refers to EC-12 with Ireland and Luxembourg being excluded.
                                                
1  Firms in the sample may service individual countries in the EU either through exporting or through
multinational production, or both simultaneously. However, a sample selection problem emerges in so far as
the database does not contain purely national firms.Hence, it is important to distinguish between horizontally and vertically integrated
multinationals, especially as some of the forces leading to the emergence of horizontal
multinationals are in sharp contrast to the forces leading to the presence of vertical
multinationals. In trying to identify testable hypotheses for the empirical section, I will draw
mainly on the results of Markusen et al. (1996), which to the best of my knowledge, provide
the only theoretical framework which synthesises the emergence of both horizontal and
vertical multinationals.
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Their model assumes that there are two countries producing two homogenous
products, with two factors of production: skilled and unskilled labour. Both factors of
production are mobile between sectors but immobile between countries. Sector one is
characterised by skilled labour being used in the firm-specific fixed costs, while a
combination of both production factors is used for the fixed plant set up costs. Unskilled
labour is only used in variable costs and transport costs between countries. In the second
sector, perfect competition is assumed to prevail. This sector is taken as the numéraire.
Further assumptions for sector one are, firstly, that skilled labour requirements for the
generation of multi-plant and plant-level economies of scale are identical for national
exporting firms and vertical multinationals. The only difference is that vertical multinationals
draw part of the skilled labour requirement from the host country. Thus, the nature of the
vertical MNE is similar to the treatment in Helpman (1984), i.e. production and trade in
intermediates are not considered.
Secondly, the skilled labour requirements in fixed costs are larger for horizontal
multinationals than those for vertical multinationals or national firms. This is due to the fact
that horizontal multinationals are assumed to operate two manufacturing plants, as opposed to
vertical multinationals or national firms, which operate just one. However, the skilled labour
requirements in fixed costs by horizontal multinationals are less than twice the requirement of
vertical multinationals or national firms. This reflects the joint-input characteristic of firm-
specific assets.
Thirdly, unskilled labour requirements are assumed to be identical for all plants and
are drawn entirely from the country where the plant is located. Lastly, it is assumed that there
is some small cost to separate headquarters from production.
3
                                                
2  Some readers may regard it as weakness to review the Markusen et al. (1996) paper without referring to
mathematical expressions. We feel that, due to the requirements of brevity, we would not be able to do justice
to the complexity and richness of the paper. Rather, we would like to appeal to the economic intiuition behind
the results and hope that the reader finds this acceptable.
3 This is to avoid degeneracy of the model.Table 2











•  firm-level economies of scale are large,
•  plant level economies of scale are low,
•  countries are large,
•  trade costs are moderate to high,
•  countries are similar in their relative factor endowments,





•  trade costs are moderate to low,








•  trade costs are low and countries are similar in their relative
factor endowments and size,
•  trade costs are moderate and countries are very different in
size.
Source: Markusen et al. (1996)
The simulated theoretical propositions, summarised in table 2 above, suggest firstly,
that horizontal multinationals tend to exist if firm-level economies of scale and trade costs are
large relative to plant-level economies of scale. This result appears in numerous horizontal
models (Brainard, 1993a; Horstmann & Markusen (1992); Markusen & Venables (1996a,b,
1998) and has also been confirmed in recent empirical studies by Brainard (1997), Ekholm
(1998).
The idea is that firms have to trade off the benefits of proximity to customers with the
concentration of production at a single plant. Proximity to customers saves transport costs,
while concentration of production allows the firm to reap the benefits of plant-level
economies of scale. It is clear, however, that horizontal multinationals cannot arise if transport
costs are assumed to be negligible. This is due to the fact that, by establishing a manufacturing
plant abroad, the horizontal multinational has to incur fixed plant set up costs without being
able to save on transport costs from doing so.
Secondly, horizontal multinationals are associated with similar relative and absolute
factor endowments. Again, these results are consistent with horizontal models of Brainard
(1993a) and Markusen & Venables (1996a,b, 1998). These predictions are also supported by
recent empirical evidence which reaches the conclusion that multinational activity is mainly
promoted by country size and factor endowment similarities (e.g. Brainard, 1997; Ekholm,
1998).
                                                
4  Hypothesis 6 is not testable as the data only contains Swedish outward multinationality. Hypotheses 9 and 10
are not testable either, as the database does not contain purely national firms.If countries become dissimilar with respect to relative factor endowments, the skilled
labour abundant country will have a comparative advantage in producing goods in sector one.
In this case, single plant firms have an advantage over two-plant firms, as horizontal
multinationals locate production in the high cost factor market.
If countries become dissimilar with respect to country size, the larger country will have
an advantage of producing goods in sector one due to the home market effect. Moreover,  the
larger country will have a higher real price of skilled labour, which is due to the general
equilibrium constraint. This is assuming that production of the product in sector one is
relatively skilled labour intensive. In this case, multinational production has two cost
advantages over exporting; saving on transport costs and lower prices of skilled labour.
Allowing multinationals to enter, raises the demand and price for skilled labour in the smaller
country. In this sense, multinationals reduce factor price differences. If country size
differences become too pronounced, however, production in the smaller country can no longer
be sustained as output levels are too small to recoup fixed plant set up costs. This explains the
association of horizontal multinationals with similarity of absolute and relative factor
endowments.
If factor endowments and transport costs are such that two plant, i.e. horizontal
multinationals, cannot be sustained, the question as to whether the equilibrium is dominated
by vertical multinationals or national firms hinges on the fact of whether factor prices are
equalised internationally. If factor prices are virtually equalised, vertical multinationals cannot
be supported due to the cost disadvantage of splitting headquarter services and production. If
factor prices fail to equalise, vertical multinationals can enter, as they fragment headquarter
services and production, such that headquarter services are located in the skilled labour
abundant country, while production takes place in the unskilled labour abundant country.
These results are consistent with the work by Helpman (1984), Helpman & Krugman (1985)
and Zhang & Markusen (1996).
There is only limited evidence for the factor proportions explanation of multinational
sales. Brainard’s (1993b) results reject the pure factor proportions explanation. In an attempt
to separate horizontally and vertically integrated multinationals, she finds that affiliate
production destined for exports back to the US differs from that destined for local sales. The
factor proportions hypothesis is generally supported in explaining the share exported back to
the US. To be more precise, the share of affiliate sales accounted for by exports back to theUS increases with differences in per capita endowments of capital, and illiterate labour, and
decreases with differences in unskilled, literate labour, and transport costs.
Ekholm (1998) also finds some support for the factor proportions explanation in that
the share of the net outward foreign production to total foreign production is positively
increasing in absolute capital per capita differences, and particularly in human capital
differences. Her results are consistent with earlier obtained results, which indicated that
outward foreign production is positively affected by the home country’s relative endowment
in overall and human capital (Ekholm, 1995, 1997).
Another important issue to be considered is the effect of both horizontal and vertical
multinationals on trade volumes. Horizontal multinationals have the tendency of reducing
trade volumes between countries. This was suggested in models by Brainard (1993a),
Markusen & Venables (1996a,b, 1998).
For vertical multinationals, such a clear prediction is not possible. Firstly, investment
liberalisation, followed by entry of vertical multinationals, may lead to the reversal of trade
flows. The reason is the geographical separation of the production stages, which results in the
home country importing the final product rather than exporting it, as would be the case with
purely national firms.
Secondly, investment liberalisation may lead to increases in trade flows. There has
been a considerable debate in the literature as to whether exports and multinational production
are substitutes or complements. In the case of Sweden, empirical evidence demonstrates some
complementarity between exports and multinational sales (Swedenborg, 1979, 1982;
Blomström et al., 1988). In contrast to these studies Svensson (1996) finds some evidence of
substitutability, which is especially pronounced for EU countries.
In theory, increases in trade flows are especially likely if one country is small and
skilled labour abundant, whilst the other country is large and unskilled labour abundant.
Indeed, it may be argued that this scenario reflects the case of Sweden. In such a case,
investment liberalisation has the effect of relaxing constraints in both the small and large
country. In the small country, production of the final product is constrained due to unskilled
labour scarcity and a small domestic market, while in the large country, production of
headquarter services is constrained due to the high price of skilled labour. Thus, investment
liberalisation may lead to relocation of headquarter services to the small skilled labour
abundant country. Production would take place in the larger country, which exports the finalproduct to the small country, while the small country exports headquarter services to the large
country. As a result the volume of exports may increase.
One can detect many stylised Swedish facts as presented by Andersson et al. (1996) in
this scenario. Firstly, Sweden is the home country of many multinationals in relation to its
country size. Secondly, the internationalisation process of Swedish multinationals was
characterised by expansion through foreign affiliates between 1970 and 1990. Thirdly, the
relationship between parent and EU affiliate is to a significant extent of a vertical rather than
horizontal nature.
III. DATA
The data is taken from the database at the Research Institute of Industrial Economics
(IUI) in Stockholm. This database contains information on the foreign operations of individual
Swedish multinationals with more than 50 employees in the manufacturing industry.
5 We
shall consider the operations of Swedish multinationals in ten individual EU member states.
Ireland and Luxembourg had to be excluded. This is because industrial variables were taken
mainly from OECD’s STAN database, which includes neither of these countries. Data for
Germany refers to West Germany prior to 1990 and to united Germany from 1991 onwards.
The variables are defined in million SEK and 1990 prices. The analysis covers the years 1974,
1978, 1986, 1990 and 1994. Earlier years had to be excluded, as the questionnaire prior to
1974 only covered firms’ exports for countries where foreign production was established. No
survey was conducted in 1982. The data set is pooled over these years. Interaction variables
are used to test for structural differences between horizontal and vertical multinationals.
IV. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
The share of foreign production:  AFFSHi,k,t
The dependent variable takes account of exports and multinational production being








The production volume of a multinational i in country k at time t is defined as the sum
of all affiliates’ total sales in country k at time t minus the sum of their total imports from
their parent company in Sweden at time t. Thus, we make an attempt to disentangle affiliates’
                                                
5  For a complete documentation of the database see Andersson et al. (1996).production from pure resale activities of imported products. Exports are defined as firm i’s
total exports to country k at time t. Exports include both exports of finished products, which
may be sold by the affiliate in country k, and intermediate products, which are used by the
affiliate for further processing. We distinguish between horizontal and vertical multinationals
in employing interaction variables, which take account of the extent of vertical integration
between parent and its EU affiliates.
Econometric Estimation Method
It is immediately apparent that the dependent variable may be censored. Censoring of
the dependent variable usually refers to a sample where some observations of the dependent
variable are not observed, while the independent variables are observed (e.g. Maddala, 1983;
Greene, 1993). In this case estimation of the dependent variable by Ordinary Least Squares
will result in biased coefficient estimates. To avoid this problem we formulate a Tobit
regression model, which accounts for censoring at both the lower and upper tail.
AFFSH is censored at both tails, as firms export to EU countries, but are not
necessarily engaged in multinational production in these countries. Additionally, there are
cases where the Swedish parent supplies the foreign market entirely via multinational
production, but not via exports from Sweden.
6 The specification for AFFSH  takes the
following form:
yß x ii i
* = ′ +µ , where  yi
* is the underlying latent variable and
yy ii =
* if 0 1 << yi
*
yi = 0 if yi
* ≤ 0
yi = 1 if  yi
* ≥1
Explanatory Variables
This section briefly presents the proxies and variables that are used in the econometric
analysis. The exact definitions and the data source are shown in table 3. As the proxy for firm-
level economies of scale, we use the R&D to sales ratio (R&D) of individual firms.
7 The
importance of plant-level economies of scale is captured by the ratio of the average industry
                                                
6  Unfortunately, we cannot account for any relationship between affiliates within the EU.
7  It would have been worth while to include firms’ marketing or advertising expenditures. However, such data
is only available for 1994, and could therefore not be included in the estimations.plant size to the firm size in Sweden (LSCALE).
8 In doing so, we attempt to ensure that the
firms operate at the minimum efficient scale of production.
Table 3
Table with Variables and Data Sources
Proxy Variable Definition Data Source




The log of the ratio of the average plant size
in terms of employees to the firm size in the
Swedish market
Firm size taken form IUI database. Swedish
industry census of production at the 3 and 4
digit level of the ISIC classification.  Years




The log of industry specific trade and
packaging costs expressed as share of
industry sales
Swedish industry census of production at the
3 and 4 digit level of the ISIC classification.
Years refer to 1975, 1978, 1987, 1990,
1993.
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OECD STAN database, at the 3 digit level




















OECD STAN database, at the 3 digit level



















OECD STAN database, at the 3 digit level
of the ISIC classification.


































 VFBEU VFEU VBEU it it it ,, , =+
IUI Database
Note: The subscript i, j, k, and t denotes the firm, industry, country, and time specific component, respectively.
The prefix L denotes that the variable is expressed in logarithmic form to reduce heteroscedasticity. This
was not possible for R&D as some values contain zeros.
                                                
8  In the Industrial Organisation literature it is commonplace to relate absolute measures of economies of scale
to industry or market size. As we seek to explain individual firms’ behaviour, it is more appropriate to relate
economies of scale to firm size.The measure of trade costs (LTRADE) is also taken from Swedish industry statistics. It
has neither a distance nor a country specific component, but varies over time. The country size
(LGDP) is measured by the Gross Domestic Product. We follow Brainard (1997) and use the
absolute difference in relative per capita incomes (LINCDIF) as a proxy for differences in
relative factor endowments. Additionally, we introduce the absolute difference in the relative
labour productivity (LVADIF), wages (LWAGEDIF), and unit labour costs (LUNITDIF) at the
industry level as proxies for differences in human capital, skills, and technologies.
9 
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Lastly,  vertical interaction variables are employed to analyse the structural differences
between horizontal and vertical multinationals. The aggregate extent of vertical forward
integration and backward integration between the parent and its EU affiliates, labelled VFEU
and VBEU respectively, are multiplied with the respective explanatory variables. We also
include the sum of the two measures, labelled VFBEU. In using the actual values of these
terms and not just dummy variables, we are able to avoid analysing the sensitivity of the
obtained results to different ad hoc threshold values.
V. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
Specification (I) does not distinguish between horizontal and vertical multinationals,
but merely replicates some of the most robust findings in recent empirical studies. The results,
presented in table 4, demonstrate that the share of affiliate production of Swedish
multinationals is primarily explained by the determinants associated with horizontal
multinationals (Hypotheses 2,3,4,5). The share of foreign production to total foreign sales,
AFFSH, is decreasing in plant-level economies of scale relative to firms size, and increasing
in trade costs, host country size, and in similarities in per capita income, labour productivity,
wages and unit labour costs. The coefficients of these variables are highly significant. Only
the coefficient of the R&D intensity does not have the expected sign. It is negative and
significantly so. This result will be further discussed at a later point.
                                                
9  Data on the capital labour ratio at the sectoral level is available in the STAN database. We did not to use this
measure as the data availability is much poorer than for the other measures. Its inclusion would have resulted
in too many missing observations.
10  Technological differences between countries and industries do not explicitly appear in the theoretical model
by Markusen et al. (1996). In a similar model, Markusen & Venables (1996a) have, however, shown that
horizontal multinationals are promoted if countries converge with regard to relative technologies. Therefore,
we expect absolute human capital and technology differences to have a negative impact on horizontal
multinationals.Table 4
Tobit Estimates for the Affiliate Production Share
Specification (Ia) (Ib) (Ic) (Id)
Interaction variable NO NO NO NO
Dep. Var. AFFSH AFFSH AFFSH AFFSH









Log likelihood -1252.4 -1258.3 -1256.6 -1260.2
CONSTANT -5.134 -5.766 -5.581 -6.062
(-9.172) (-10.047) (-9.828) (-10.245)
R&D -2.352 -2.537 -2.556 -2.303
(-3.151) (-3.417) (-3.472) (-3.089)
LSCALE -0.341 -0.339 -0.343 -0.338
(-12.808) (-12.787) (-12.845) (-12.705)
LTRADE 0.246 0.244 0.254 0.252
(5.679) (5.706) (5.889) (5.829)
LGDP 0.228 0.265 0.251 0.283









T-statistic in brackets. Time fixed effects are included. Estimates are heteroscedasticity consistent.
The results in specifications (II), (III) and (IV), shown in tables 5, 6, and 7,
demonstrate clearly the presence of significant differences between horizontal and vertical
multinationals. The log-likelihood ratio test statistic strongly rejects the restriction of
parameter equality of horizontally and vertically multinationals.
11
Firstly, the results for horizontal multinationals are essentially those obtained in
specification (I). Horizontal multinationals are strongly associated with the proximity-
concentration trade-off explanation of multinational sales and with similarities in relative
factor endowments, and thus with similarities in technologies, skills and human capital. Thus,
these results adequately confirm the theoretical predictions for the emergence of horizontal
multinationals (Hypotheses 2,3,4,5).
                                                
11  The Log-Likelihood statistic for testing restrictions is λ= -2( ln L
*- ln L), where L
* and L refer to the
restricted and unrestricted estimation, respectively. This statistic is asymptotically distributed as Chi-squared
with J degrees of freedom (e.g. Greene, 1993).Table 5
Tobit Estimates for the Affiliate Production Share and the differences between
horizontally and vertically forward integrated multinationals
Specification (IIa) (IIb) (IIc) (IId)
Interaction variable VFEU VFEU VFEU VFEU
Dep. Var. AFFSH AFFSH AFFSH AFFSH









Log likelihood -1219.2 -1224.0 -1222.2 -1226.5
CONSTANT -4.982 -5.579 -5.380 -5.908
(-9.069) (-9.999) (-9.750) (-10.269)
R&D -2.109 -2.395 -2.327 -2.062
(-2.181) (-2.454) (-2.412) (-2.109)
LSCALE -0.351 -0.350 -0.354 -0.351
(-12.278) (-12.320) (-12.331) (-12.342)
LTRADE 0.141 0.144 0.154 0.149
(3.150) (3.268) (3.486) (3.344)
LGDP 0.228 0.262 0.248 0.282









R&D-V 7.053 7.535 7.352 7.209
(2.448) (2.638) (2.533) (2.483)
LSCALE-V 0.455 0.471 0.475 0.472
(3.996) (4.092) (4.086) (4.151)
LTRADE-V -0.306 -0.347 -0.360 -0.330
(-1.580) (-1.890) (-1.925) (-1.785)
LGDP-V 0.086 0.083 0.088 0.083









T-statistic in brackets. Time fixed effects are included. Estimates are heteroscedasticity consistent. The suffix -V
indicates the inclusion of a vertical interaction term.
One very interesting result is that the coefficient of the R&D intensity is negatively
significant in almost all specifications, which is contrary to expectation. The negative
coefficient may be related to technology transfer costs between parents and affiliates. As
Norbäck (1998) has demonstrated in the case of horizontal multinationals, the expectation of a
positive R&D coefficient hinges on the assumption of technology transfer costs betweenparent and affiliates being unrelated to the magnitude of the R&D intensity. Allowing instead
that technology transfer costs and the R&D intensity are positively related, as technical
personnel, scientists and other managerial staff have to be sent to foreign affiliates to
supervise implementation of the firm-specific assets, is consistent with the expectation of a
negative coefficient of the R&D intensity.
Table 6
Tobit Estimates for the Affiliate Production Share and the differences between
horizontally and vertically backward integrated multinationals
Specification (IIIa) (IIIb) (IIIc) (IIId)
Interaction variable VBEU VBEU VBEU VBEU
Dep. Var. AFFSH AFFSH AFFSH AFFSH









Log likelihood -1205.0 -1205.9 -1205.0 -1221.7
CONSTANT -5.017 -5.508 -5.347 -6.158
(-9.076) (-9.959) (-9.636) (-10.481)
R&D -1.955 -2.371 -2.510 -1.816
(-2.207) (-2.729) (-2.871) (-2.078)
LSCALE -0.341 -0.343 -0.347 -0.338
(-12.285) (-12.432) (-12.367) (-12.374)
LTRADE 0.214 0.219 0.231 0.217
(4.433) (4.587) (4.800) (4.536)
LGDP 0.232 0.257 0.245 0.295









R&D-V 1.231 4.066 5.883 -1.943
(0.233) (0.778) (1.078) (-0.363)
LSCALE-V 0.224 0.172 0.174 0.074
(1.379) (1.041) (1.064) (0.450)
LTRADE-V -0.414 -0.450 -0.486 -0.277
(-1.140) (-1.217) (-1.311) (-0.758)
LGDP-V -0.025 -0.035 -0.035 -0.010









T-statistic in brackets. Time fixed effects are included. Estimates are heteroscedasticity consistent. The suffix -V
indicates the inclusion of a vertical interaction term.Table 7
Tobit Estimates for the Affiliate Production Share and the differences between
horizontally and vertically forward and backward integrated multinationals
Specification (IVa) (IVb) (IVc) (IVd)
Interaction variable VFBEU VFBEU VFBEU VFBEU
Dep. Var. AFFSH AFFSH AFFSH AFFSH









Log likelihood -1190.8 -1190.9 -1190.6 -1200.5
CONSTANT -4.919 -5.382 -5.237 -5.959
(-8.983) (-9.853) (-9.555) (-10.352)
R&D -1.643 -2.191 -1.999 -1.649
(-1.406) (-1.851) (-1.707) (-1.384)
LSCALE -0.353 -0.352 -0.357 -0.350
(-11.926) (-11.995) (-11.954) (-11.947)
LTRADE 0.162 0.164 0.181 0.166
(3.293) (3.416) (3.713) (3.369)
LGDP 0.228 0.254 0.242 0.288









R&D-V 4.813 6.214 5.736 5.033
(1.589) (2.063) (1.889) (1.627)
LSCALE-V 0.377 0.381 0.387 0.360
(3.881) (3.941) (4.008) (3.756)
LTRADE-V -0.462 -0.471 -0.509 -0.449
(-2.559) (-2.719) (-2.886) (-2.453)
LGDP-V 0.065 0.056 0.065 0.066









T-statistic in brackets. Time fixed effects are included. Estimates are heteroscedasticity consistent. The suffix -V
indicates the inclusion of a vertical interaction term.
Furthermore, there is a significant structural difference between horizontally and
vertically forward integrated multinationals as the coefficient of R&D-V is positively
significant in specifications (II) and (IVb,c,d). This may indicate that their technology transfer
costs are independent of the R&D intensity. This is likely to be the case if vertical
multinationals are to embody the technology in the exports of intermediates to their affiliates.This enables them to reduce opportunistic behaviour and may help to fully appropriate the
returns of the undertaken research and the development of new technology. Hence, vertical
multinationals are able to embody the technology transfer in the trade costs which have to be
incurred, while horizontal multinationals’ technology transfer costs may rise with the R&D
intensity.
Furthermore, in accordance with hypothesis (2), the achievement of the minimum
efficient scale of production is of significantly less importance for vertically integrated
multinationals. The coefficient of LSCALE-V  is positively significant at the 1% level in
specifications (II) and (IV). This indicates that, in contrast to horizontal multinationals,
vertically integrated multinationals can compensate the cost penalty of producing below
minimum efficient scale to some extent, as they are able to fragment the production process
geographically, and thereby are able to exploit differences in relative factor endowments,  and
thus factor prices.
With regard to hypotheses (4) and (7) there is strong evidence to suggest that high
trade costs promote horizontal integration between parent and affiliates, while low trade cost
favour vertical integration. The coefficient of LTRADE is highly significant in all
specifications, while the coefficient of LTRADE-V is negatively significant in specifications
(IIb,c,d) and (IV). Noteworthy is also that the net coefficient is negative.
The host country size seems to play a more important role for vertically forward
integrated multinationals. The coefficient of LGDP-V is positively significant at the 5% level
in specifications (II) and (IV), which is not in line with hypothesis (3). This hypothesis is
however partly the result of the assumption of vertical multinationals operating one plant only.
In a different model Zhang & Markusen (1996) have shown that the host country market size
is of importance for the emergence of vertical multinationals if they operate two plants and
engage in intra-firm trade in intermediates.
12 Small countries have difficulties in attracting
vertically integrated multinationals, as transport costs have to be incurred for a large share of
finished products when shipping them back to the home country. On the contrary, a large host
country market size facilitates the presence of vertical multinationals, as the transport costs
have to be incurred for the intermediate product but not for the final product. In specification
                                                
12  Please note that the model by Zhang & Markusen (1996) does not incorporate horizontal multinationals. The
model assumes that a necessary intermediate product can only be produced in the skilled labour abundant
country. The final product can either be produced by home country firms or by foreign affiliates. The
production of the final product uses the intermediate product and unskilled labour in variable costs, whilst a
certain amount of local skilled labour is needed in plant-set up fixed costs. The results suggest that the
Foreign Direct Investment level falls to zero if the host country has a very scarce skilled labour endowment.
Furthermore, the larger the host country size the larger the investment to GDP ratio becomes.(III), the LGDP-V coefficient is negative, albeit insignificantly so. The negative coefficient is
intuitively appealing, as the host country size is not as important a location factor if a
significant share of the affiliate production is exported back to the home country Sweden.
Concerning relative factor endowments, i.e. hypothesis (8), the results indeed suggest
that they are significant determinants for the emergence of vertically integrated multinationals.
This is particularly true in the case of multinationals being vertically backward integrated and
relative factor endowment differences being analysed at the sectoral level. Firstly, in
specifications (IIIa) and (IVa), LINCDIF-V is positively significant. Secondly, there is strong
evidence at the sectoral level that differences in the labour productivity and wages, and thus
technology, skills and human capital are important determinants of the affiliate production
share of vertically integrated multinationals. The coefficients of LVADIF-V and LWAGEDIF-
V are positively significant at the 10% level or better in specifications (IIb, IIIb, IVb) and (IIIc,
IVc), respectively. This result is in sharp contrast with that obtained for horizontal
multinationals. Unfortunately however, it is not completely robust across all three
specifications, as only weakly significant effects could be found for vertically forward
integrated multinationals. Also, differences in unit labour costs do not seem to be a significant
motive for vertical integration.
Taken together, these results suggest, nevertheless, that vertical multinationals
fragment production stages geographically in order to take advantage of differences in relative
factor endowments and factor prices. The results also suggest that relative factor endowments
may be best analysed at the sectoral level as nations are inherently heterogeneous entities.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Recent developments in the new trade and investment literature suggest that there are
fundamental differences between horizontal and vertical multinationals. Horizontal
multinationals tend to emerge due to market proximity considerations, which have to be
traded off against concentration of production. Other important determinants are a large host
country size and similarities in relative factor endowments. On the contrary, vertical
multinationals fragment production into geographically separate stages to exploit factor price,
and thus relative factor endowment differences or technologies. As a result, vertical
multinationals engage in intra-firm trade, and therefore tend to emerge if transport costs are
low and relative factor endowment differences are large.Previous empirical results suggest that foreign production is mainly promoted by the
proximity-concentration trade-off considerations and, to a minor extent, by the factor
proportions explanation (Brainard, 1993b, 1997; Ekholm, 1995, 1997, 1998). These studies
fail, however, to distinguish between horizontal and vertical multinationals. This paper makes
a first explicit attempt to distinguish between horizontal and vertical multinationals. The
results can be summarised as follows:
Firstly, if horizontal and vertical multinationals are not distinguished, then the
aggregate activity of Swedish multinationals in the EU is mainly driven by the proximity-
concentration trade-off explanation of multinationals sales and by similarities in relative factor
endowments.
Secondly, the affiliate production share of horizontal multinationals is decreasing in
firm and plant-level economies of scale, and increasing in large host country size, and
similarities in per capita income, labour productivity, wages and unit labour costs. Almost all
of these results are consistent with the theoretical predictions, and with earlier results by
Brainard (1997) and Ekholm (1998).
Thirdly, there are significant differences between horizontally and vertically integrated
multinationals. They emerge with regard to firm and plant-level economies of scale, host
country market size, trade costs, and relative factor endowments and factor prices. In contrast
to horizontal multinationals, vertically integrated multinationals can compensate the cost
penalty of producing below minimum scale of production, as they fragment the production
process geographically, and thereby not only are able to exploit differences in relative factor
endowments but also relative factor prices.
Summing up, the factor proportions explanation of multinational sales is an important
determinant for the explanation of the activities of Swedish multinationals in the EU. At the
aggregate level however, multinational activity is primarily explained by the proximity-
concentration trade-off explanation. Hence, one may argue that the proximity-concentration
hypothesis overshadows the factor proportions explanation. This reinforces previous empirical
results.
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